keepgrabbing.py : additions, and documents. by Camille Akmut




Important program continues to be reviewed from all perspectives.
1
Additions
Python’s str() function takes an object and converts it to a string…
>>> str(1)
'1'






In Python, the single quotes ‘ ‘ do not signify a character as opposed to a string; for which double
quotes “ “ would be used - in Haskell.
In that former language, they are the same (type of objects, they have the same type) :
>>> '1' == "1"
True







Haskell’s version of Python’s split() is words  (from the Data.List module) :
Prelude Data.List> words "article1 article2"
["article1","article2"]
Here I’ve re-written the proxy of the lambda function that I showed, in Haskell :
Prelude> line = (\x -> x*2)
Prelude> line 3
6
Prelude> blocks = [3,2,1]
Prelude> map line blocks
[6,4,2]
(mapping is the functional programming equivalent of looping, as found in languages with
imperative elements / Python)
or, closer to Aaron’s application :
Prelude> line = (\x -> ["curl"] ++ [x])
Prelude> line "--proxy"
["curl","--proxy"]
Now you may be asking yourself : how do we go from this list of strings, to something that could
be passed to Curl/Wget or the Shell?
We do this :
Prelude> unwords ["curl","--proxy"]
"curl --proxy"
(Haskell has a function just for this, unwords.
If it did not we would have needed to write our own, most likely a fold.
Here :
Prelude> foldr (\x y -> x ++ y) [] ["curl ", "--proxy"]
"curl --proxy"
Can also be simplified to foldr (++), which turns out is the definition of concat . This is because
of point-free style I believe.
We would have used head  to extract the string if a list had been given back to us as
intermediary result, but such is not the case.







IP address changed once, Class C
network blocked
Oct. 9th 2010 8k .pdfs (only) entire MIT network blocked




new IP address, slowed below-monitoring
downloading.
“Overall, more than 450,000 articles spanning 560 journals were downloaded between 5:00 p.m.
Saturday and 4:00 a.m. Sunday. (…)
JSTOR engineers temporarily blocked further downloads directed to the MIT … IP address issuing
the requests. But the downloading continued from a different IP address. (…)
The next day, Sunday, September 26, 2010, JSTOR shut off access for the entire range of
addresses (Class C network) containing the two addresses. (…) The first IP address was
18.55.6.215, and the second address was 18.55.6.216. The blocked range consisted of all IP
addresses beginning with 18.55.6 (…)
The network DHCP server maintains a log, called a DHCP log, which records the IP address
assigned to a MAC address, as part of the DHCP process. At MIT, an IP address will often identify
the building where network device is located.“
“Two weeks later, on Saturday, October 9, 2010, during the Columbus Day weekend, a second,
similar incident occurred: a visitor downloaded more JSTOR articles, using a slightly modified
MAC address. (…) JSTOR’s response was to shut down service, at approximately 11:15 p.m. on
October 9, 2010, to all MIT’s IP addresses, that is, the entire Class A network, doing so quickly
enough that only about 8,000 articles were downloaded during this incident.“
“December 26, 2010, JSTOR again noticed excessive downloading
from MIT, originating from a new IP address. Significantly, this most recent
downloading had been going on for some time, beginning in late November, but JSTOR
did not realize this fact until much later. The manner of accessing downloads had been
slowed and altered in such a way that JSTOR’s monitoring systems did not identify that
the robotic harvesting had resumed.”
(Abelson et al. 2013, ‘Report to the President’)
“Cookie: TENACIOUS=” + str(random.random())[3:]
>>> "Cookie: TENACIOUS=" + str(random.random())[3:]
'Cookie: TENACIOUS=2113961635582544'
>>> "Cookie: TENACIOUS=" + str(random.random())[3:]
'Cookie: TENACIOUS=6451074056572803'
“It deleted its JSTOR cookie after each download, disconnected, and then re-accessed JSTOR,
resulting in a new cookie being placed on the machine each time this occurred and making it
appear that this was a new machine for each access.“ (Ibid.)
(I’m not entirely sure that Abelson’s understanding of the program here is entirely correct.




– Document 1 : Abelson et al., Report to the President of MIT.
– Document 2 : USA v. Swartz.
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Part	  I: EVENTS	  LEADING	  TO	  THE	  ARREST	  
I.A Downloading	  of	  JSTOR	  Articles	  
The history of the events leading to the arrest of Aaron Swartz in January 2011 begins the 
previous fall with the JSTOR (Journal Storage) digital library, a service that licenses 
scholarly journals to numerous academic and research organizations, including MIT.1  
On the evening of Saturday, September 25, 2010, JSTOR engineers noticed an extremely 
large number of requests for downloads originating from MIT. Overall, more than 
450,000 articles spanning 560 journals were downloaded between 5:00 p.m. Saturday and 
4:00 a.m. Sunday.2 The volume of data transferred was enough to overload the affected 
JSTOR server. In response, JSTOR engineers temporarily blocked further downloads 
directed to the MIT Internet Protocol (IP) address issuing the requests.3 But the 
downloading continued from a different IP address.  
                                                
1 See Appendix 6 for more information on JSTOR and the MIT Libraries. 
2 Ordinarily, when someone requests a download from JSTOR, the system pops up a window that refers 
to JSTOR’s terms of use, and requires the user to click to confirm before the download can proceed. This 
not only notifies the user of JSTOR’s terms, but also limits the rate at which automated downloads can be 
requested. In this case, however, the download script included a flag (acceptTC=true) that bypassed the 
acceptance step. 
3 In an effort to warn the person causing these downloads to stop, JSTOR’s engineers caused a web page 
to be presented to the computer engaged in the downloading, reading:  
Access Suspended—We noticed content downloading activity from your IP address (18.55.6.215) 
that appears to be in excess of what is allowed under our Terms & Conditions of Use. Please review our 
terms for more information about allowable uses. If you have additional questions or need other 
information, please contact JSTOR Support. 
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The next day, Sunday, September 26, 2010, JSTOR shut off access for the entire range of 
addresses (Class C network) containing the two addresses.4 It sent an email to the MIT 
Libraries5 (“the Libraries”) notifying them of this fact, and explaining that JSTOR “rarely 
takes this level of response to abusive activity, but felt it necessary to maintain the 
stability of the Web site for other institutions and users.” JSTOR further noted in that 
email that the manner in which the download requests came into its system “clearly 
indicates robotic harvesting of PDFs [articles] which violates our Terms & Conditions of 
Use.” Reflecting its contractual agreement with JSTOR, the Libraries began to work with 
JSTOR in an effort to determine the source of the downloading and stop it from 
continuing. 
JSTOR sought MIT’s assistance to prevent the incident’s recurrence. The Libraries 
responded: “We’re investigating this case and, because the origin of the activity was a 
guest visiting MIT, we believe that it will not recur. We hope that you will be able to 
restore the Class C range that has been suspended on this information.” In response, 
JSTOR turned all of MIT’s IP addresses back on, and decided to watch.  
To provide some context for this event, we note that the Libraries handled 65 excessive 
use incidents during the 2010–2011 academic year. Typically, when an excessive use 
case is reported that is determined to originate from within MIT’s network, the Libraries 
report this to either the MIT Information Services and Technology (IS&T) network 
security team6 or MIT’s “Stopit” group, which deals with inappropriate behavior that 
occurs electronically. The Stopit group’s general response is to send the offender a 
warning email message. This is almost always all that is needed to get people’s attention 
and have them stop whatever it was they were doing that caused the problem. In this case, 
however, the computer was registered to a visitor, and the registrant used an anonymous 
                                                
4 The first IP address was 18.55.6.215, and the second address was 18.55.6.216. The blocked range 
consisted of all IP addresses beginning with 18.55.6 followed by a number from 0 through 255. Such a 
range (four numbers, with the first three fixed, and the last one taking on any value from 0 to 255) is called 
a Class C network.  
 IP (Internet Protocol) addresses specify the network port where the device is attached. They are 
typically automatically assigned, when the device is attached, by a network service called a DHCP 
(Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) server, although people with sufficient computer skills can change 
the IP address (as was done here). In addition to the IP address, each device has a MAC (Media Access 
Control) address, which uniquely identifies the device’s hardware network interface itself (essentially, the 
device itself, as opposed to where it is attached to the network). MAC addresses are typically assigned by 
the device manufacturer, although these, too, can be changed under program control. The network DHCP 
server maintains a log, called a DHCP log, which records the IP address assigned to a MAC address, as part 
of the DHCP process. At MIT, an IP address will often identify the building where network device is 
located. 
5 Email sent Sunday, September 26, 2010, at 12:31 p.m.  
6 Most cases of excessive downloading are due to misappropriation of MIT credentials, in which case the 
true MIT user is asked to change his/her password. 
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email address that could not be contacted.7 (As described in section I.E.1, guests may 
register to use the MIT network by supplying a name and an email address as contact 
information, and they obtain a registration that is valid for a limited time period.) IS&T 
therefore disabled the registration of the MAC address used by the offending computer, 
expecting that this would be a sufficient deterrent to further activity.  
Two weeks later, on Saturday, October 9, 2010, during the Columbus Day weekend, a 
second, similar incident occurred: a visitor downloaded more JSTOR articles, using a 
slightly modified MAC address.8  
This time, the requests and downloads stimulated a cascade of failures that brought down 
multiple JSTOR servers. Half the servers in one data center failed, and JSTOR engineers 
feared that the entire service might go down worldwide. Moreover, the requests seemed 
to be coming from thousands of machines.9 
JSTOR’s response was to shut down service, at approximately 11:15 p.m. on October 9, 
2010, to all MIT’s IP addresses, that is, the entire Class A network,10 doing so quickly 
enough that only about 8,000 articles were downloaded during this incident. JSTOR 
observed that the downloaded articles were not limited to a specific discipline, but were 
sequential across JSTOR’s entire database. To JSTOR, this indicated “a concerted effort 
is being made to download the entirety of the JSTOR archive.” JSTOR notified MIT 
Libraries of its findings by email, and spoke directly with personnel at the Libraries about 
its concerns.  
                                                
7 The addresses supplied with the registrations were generated by Mailinator 
(<http://www.mailinator.com>), a service that creates on-the-fly temporary email addresses.  
8 (See footnote 4 for an explanation of MAC addresses.) The initial MAC address was 00:23:5a:73:5f:fb, 
registered on September 24, 2010, to a “person” named “Gary Host.” The second (slightly modified) MAC 
address was 00:23:5a:73:5f:fc, registered on October 2, to “Gary Host.” These were the same machine, as 
evidenced by the similarity of MAC addresses and the fact that they presented the same DCHP client ID, 
“ghost-laptop,” to the DHCP server. The MAC address provided is consistent with this being an Acer 
laptop. (See Appendix 7 for information on DHCP.) In addition, there was a second machine registered, on 
October 8, 2010, to “Grace Host” with the MAC address 00:17:f2:2c:b0:74. This machine had the client ID 
“ghost-macbook,” and the MAC address is consistent with this being an Apple MacBook. There was also a 
third registration, on October 22, 2010, with user name “Grace Host” and client ID “ghost-laptop,” with 
MAC address 00:4c:e5:a0:c7:55, and again a registration on November 28, 2010, with MAC address 
00:4c:e5:a0:c7:56. These registrations are for the Acer laptop that was discovered in the closet. (See section 
I.B below.) The MAC addresses used here are invalid: they do not correspond to any manufacturer ID. This 
is apparently the same “ghost-laptop” machine as was registered on September 24. One can conjecture that 
the owner, having seen the first MAC address blocked, and the second, slightly modified address also 
blocked, set the machine to a radically different MAC address.  
9 In actuality, there was only one machine. It deleted its JSTOR cookie after each download, 
disconnected, and then re-accessed JSTOR, resulting in a new cookie being placed on the machine each 
time this occurred and making it appear that this was a new machine for each access.  
10 That is, the range of IP addresses starting with 18 and followed by three numbers (i.e., 18.x.x.x). 
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Both MIT and JSTOR were anxious for service to MIT to be restored. JSTOR believed 
that it could monitor the system and stop further incidents because it had been able to 
notice and stop the latest one after only 8,000 articles had been downloaded. Based on 
this, JSTOR agreed to restore service to MIT and did so on Tuesday, October 12, 2010, 
after three days of the entire campus being blocked. At the same time, IS&T blocked 
access from the individual MAC address most recently associated with the downloading. 
Meanwhile, IS&T staff were able to determine that the downloading activity had 
originated from the Dorrance Building (Building 16), an academic building in the central 
campus.11 
Also on October 12, the Director of the MIT Libraries reported to MIT’s Academic 
Council12 that a cyber-attack of the JSTOR database had caused a weekend shutdown of 
JSTOR to the entire campus.  
Following the suspension of service to the entire MIT campus during October 9 through 
12, JSTOR decided to monitor closely for additional downloading activity and be 
prepared to suspend access as necessary.  
On the evening of December 26, 2010, JSTOR again noticed excessive downloading 
from MIT, originating from a new IP address. Significantly, this most recent 
downloading had been going on for some time, beginning in late November, but JSTOR 
did not realize this fact until much later. The manner of accessing downloads had been 
slowed and altered in such a way that JSTOR’s monitoring systems did not identify that 
the robotic harvesting had resumed.13 This time, JSTOR noted that the downloading 
activity originated from the same Class C network that IS&T had identified earlier as 
being in Building 16.14 JSTOR promptly notified the MIT Libraries about the new 
incident, by email, on the same evening, identifying Building 16 as the apparent location 
of the IP address. In this email, JSTOR also made the following request to MIT: “We are 
                                                
11 The September 25, 2010, downloading was also from a wired connection in Building 16. IS&T did not 
pinpoint the exact location in either September or October 2010. 
12 MIT’s Academic Council consists of the Institute’s senior leadership plus the elected Chair of the 
Faculty. It is chaired by the President and meets weekly during the academic year to confer on matters of 
Institute policy.  
13There were over 4.3 million downloads during the period from late November through Swartz’s 
eventual arrest on January 6. 
14 Beginning December 26, 2010, JSTOR took several actions to stop or at least impede the 
downloading. First, it blocked an entire Class C range of addresses for Building 16. JSTOR also kept open 
the one IP address that it observed the machine using, 18.55.6.240, and moved access for this address to a 
server separate from the rest of its network. Through this server, JSTOR responded to the machine’s 
requests by downloading strings of zeros and meaningless articles, in the expectation that: (1) the machine 
would not notice and would continue to download worthless material; and (2) this would slow any 
remaining downloading that might take place. However, the machine had also been registered with an IP 
address of 18.55.7.240, that is, with a 7.xxx instead of 6.xxx and entirely outside of the Class C range of IP 
address that JSTOR had blocked. The downloading continued unimpeded, without JSTOR realizing it.  
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requesting that every effort be made to identify the individuals responsible and to ensure 
that the content taken in this incident and those previously mentioned is secured and 
deleted.” An email sent the following day from JSTOR to the Libraries re-emphasized the 
urgency of the situation: “Once again, we are seeing extreme unauthorized activity from 
MIT. We really need to find out who is doing this; it is malicious and intentional and as 
best we can tell is coming from inside of MIT.” 
Employees of the MIT Libraries had been furloughed for the winter holidays, and thus 
they did not see the messages JSTOR sent on December 26 and 27, 2010, until Monday, 
January 3, 2011.15 On the morning of January 4, the Libraries informed JSTOR that MIT 
did not expect to be able to identify the individual involved in these incidents based on 
the information available at that point.16 
I.B 	  Discovery	  of	  the	  Laptop	  
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on January 4, 2011, IS&T staff sent an email to its network 
engineers requesting that they trace the exact location in Building 16 of the computer 
using the IP address. An IS&T network engineer began to search when he arrived for 
work in the morning, going to Building 16 and checking the basement closet containing 
the building’s network switches.17 Around 8:00 a.m., he entered the closet and saw a 
cable connected to a network switch and leading to a cardboard box on the floor. He 
lifted the box and saw a laptop computer. He telephoned an IS&T network manager, who 
quickly joined him at the closet. 
                                                
15 The MIT Libraries were closed for business from 6:00 p.m. Wednesday, December 22, 2010, through 
Sunday, January 2, 2011. The majority of these days were regular or special Institute holidays. However, 
December 27, 28, and 29, 2010 were furlough days, during which time the staff were required by the 
Libraries’ administration to take involuntary, unpaid leave as a cost-saving measure to meet budget 
reductions. Furloughed staff were explicitly prohibited from working during furlough days. Two technical 
staff members were asked to defer their furlough days to another time, so that basic technical support to the 
Libraries’ networked resources could be provided. Their directives included that (a) access to licensed 
resources was to be kept available, both on and off campus, to the degree possible; and (b) any outages 
caused by problems at MIT’s end were to be resolved promptly. In the unlikely event that a major 
aggregator or database should cut off service to MIT during this time, one of the two staff members was 
responsible for making best efforts to work with the vendor to resolve the outage. This staff member was 
copied on JSTOR’s email of December 26, 2010, to the Libraries but did not respond. The Libraries wrote 
to JSTOR on January 3, explaining that people had been on furlough and had not seen the JSTOR’s prior 
messages. This January 3 message was the Libraries’ first response to JSTOR’s December 26 and 27 
emails. 
16 The January 4 email also suggested to JSTOR that it block the entire 18.55.xxx.xxx Class B network, 
since the downloading was coming from two different Class C networks. (See footnote 14.) At the time the 
email was sent, the Libraries did not know that that laptop had been discovered a few hours before. 
17 The closet had two doors connected in the middle by a common lock, with both doors swinging 
outward when opened. He used his key to enter the basement closet; however, he does not remember 
whether the doors were actually locked. According to this network engineer, even when locked, the closet 
could be opened by pulling on both doors simultaneously because the locking mechanism had been 
damaged.  
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Over the next hour, the two engineers contacted IS&T management and the IS&T 
Security Team. The Security Team also consulted MIT’s Office of the General Counsel 
(OGC). At 9:45 a.m. IS&T management notified the MIT Police that a laptop connected 
to a network switch had been found in an electrical closet in Building 16. Two additional 
IS&T staff members arrived. Minutes later, uniformed MIT Police officers arrived in 
Building 16 and were posted in the basement hallway. A network engineer then used an 
MIT laptop to connect to the network switch, in order to monitor the traffic (packet 
stream) to and from the suspect laptop.18 Through this monitoring, the Security Team 
observed the downloading of data. 
Another member of the MIT Police arrived, accompanied by a photographer. They took 
photographs of the closet, including the box, the laptop, and a hard drive sitting under the 
laptop. The MIT Police decided that the situation required expertise in computer crime 
and forensics, which they did not have. They therefore telephoned the Cambridge Police 
Department detective who is their normal contact for assistance with computer-related 
crime activity.19  
The Cambridge detective they contacted was a member of the New England Electronic 
Crimes Task Force.20 When he received the call for assistance from the MIT Police, the 
detective was working at the Task Force field office in a federal building in Boston, 
together with other law enforcement officers whose agencies participate in the Task 
Force. He responded to the call, accompanied by two other Task Force members: a 
special agent21 of the U.S. Secret Service; and a detective from the Boston Police 
Department. They arrived at the Building 16 closet around 11:00 a.m. 
We note that no one from MIT called the Secret Service.   The MIT Police contacted the 
Cambridge detective by calling him on his individual cell phone. The special agent 
became involved because he accompanied the Cambridge detective.  As a Task Force 
member, the detective would sometimes respond to calls alone, and sometimes respond in 
                                                
18 This monitoring of the switch was accomplished by one of the engineers plugging a cable (connected 
to his MIT laptop) into a port on the switch. At no time did he or anyone else from MIT in any way connect 
to the suspect laptop itself or to its cable. With very small exceptions, the only communications observed 
were those to and from the suspect laptop. (See Appendix 7.) The packet stream was preserved on the MIT 
laptop and later made available to the Secret Service special agent who became involved in the 
investigation. 
19 The MIT Police typically make calls to the Cambridge Police for assistance in computer-related 
matters about six times a year.  In none of these incidents were federal agents part of the response. 
20 The New England Electronic Crimes Task Force 
(<http://www.secretservice.gov/ectf_newengland.shtml>) is a Boston-based alliance organized by the 
Secret Service with participants from federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as private industry 
and academia, to investigate electronic crimes, including computer system intrusion.  
21 All federal agents who are authorized to carry firearms in the course of their normal duties are referred 
to as “special agents.” Agents of the Secret Service, as well as most federal law enforcement agents, have 
the title of “special agent.” 
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the company of other members of the Task Force. The MIT Police were aware that other 
members of the Task Force might accompany the detective, and that Task Force members 
included Secret Service agents. 
When they arrived, the suspect laptop was still downloading data. Also, during the 
monitoring, the MIT network engineers had observed that the laptop was being queried 
from several sources, including on one occasion an IP address located in China. This 
information was communicated to the law enforcement officials. The fact that someone 
or some entity in China could be involved initially raised concerns that this might have 
been part of an international matter.22  
The special agent attached a USB device to the suspect laptop in an attempt to copy the 
hard drive, but this attempt was unsuccessful. Crime scene investigators from the 
Cambridge Police Department arrived and took fingerprints from the laptop and hard 
drive.23 The agencies and personnel worked together in a cooperative fashion, with no 
law enforcement group taking orders from any other. 
The law enforcement group decided to leave the laptop and hard drive in place to see if 
the person who had set it up would return. Because it was not feasible to continuously 
post MIT Police officers in the basement corridor for an indefinite period of time, and 
doing so would reveal the surveillance of the closet, the decision was made to install a 
video camera in the closet that could be monitored from elsewhere within MIT. IS&T 
installed the camera at the request of the MIT Police. At around 3:00 p.m., the basement 
closet was restored to the way it was found, with the exception of the camera having been 
installed. IS&T engineers relocated the MIT laptop they were using to another room and 
reconnected it to the MIT network to continue monitoring the network traffic to and from 
the suspect laptop, and everyone left the closet area. 
Half an hour later, an individual was seen on the video camera entering the basement 
closet. He changed the hard drive attached to the laptop, and put the old one into a 
backpack. Some of the law enforcement officers went to the closet to try to apprehend 
him, but he had left before they could arrive. No one recognized the person in the video. 
Still photos showing the suspect were taken from the video and provided to the MIT 
Police. 
During the morning’s activities in the basement closet, the special agent had asked for 
whatever electronic records MIT might have on the matter. As it is IS&T’s protocol to 
obtain approval from MIT’s Office of the General Counsel (OGC) before releasing 
                                                
22 Ultimately, MIT concluded that the communication from the IP address located in China was a—not 
unusual—“pinging” attempt by someone or some entity in China to determine what computer systems at 
MIT were available and accessible, and unrelated to the activity of this laptop.  
23 MIT Police regularly rely on Cambridge Police for latent fingerprint collection. 
PART	  I:	  EVENTS	  LEADING	  TO	  THE	  ARREST	  	  	  |	  	  	  23	  
information or materials to outside law enforcement agencies, IS&T contacted the OGC, 
which responded that it was appropriate to comply with the agent’s request in view of the 
fact that law enforcement was conducting an investigation into what was potentially 
ongoing criminal activity of unknown scope, and it did not appear to OGC that such 
information would disclose personally identifiable information.24 
IS&T turned over the following information to the Secret Service, at its request, on the 
afternoon of January 4, 2011: 
1. Network flow data, which is made up of logs showing which IP addresses 
communicated with which IP addresses; when the communication took 
place; and how much data was transferred. 
2. DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) logs, which are records of 
requests from computer clients for the DHCP service to assign IP 
addresses. These records contain MAC addresses, IP addresses, and when 
clients acknowledge the receipt of addresses. 
3. RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) logs, which 
record requests to use various network services. 
In addition, the following was made available to the Secret Service, at its request, and 
was provided to the special agent on January 25, 2011: 
4. The packet stream captured by the MIT network engineer using his laptop, 
as described above; this consisted of copies of the JSTOR downloads and 
associated control information—some 87 gigabytes in all. 
These categories of items, Nos. 1 through 4, were provided by MIT to the Secret Service 
without a subpoena having been issued to MIT. Thereafter MIT provided additional 
documents to the Office of the U.S. Attorney in response to grand jury subpoenas.25 A 
more detailed description of these items is available in Appendix 7. (Appendix 10 
addresses legal issues concerning production of the records.) 
 	  
                                                
24 At this time, IS&T knew about the JSTOR downloading, but they also were concerned that the laptop 
might be performing other actions. 
25 One such item—consisting of six records from the network registration database showing registration 
for Gary Host and Grace Host in September and October 2010—was provided by MIT in September 2011, 
under the impression that it was doing so in response to a grand jury subpoena. However, at the time those 
records were produced, this subpoena (issued on January 27, 2011) was apparently no longer valid.  
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I.C Events	  of	  January	  6,	  2011:	  The	  Arrest	  
At about 12:30 p.m. on Tuesday, January 6, someone entered the closet, as was recorded 
by the video camera. As he entered, he covered his face with a bicycle helmet, removing 
it after he entered and the doors had closed. The individual removed the laptop and hard 
drive and then left the closet. 26 When the laptop was disconnected, the port status of the 
switch changed, and a monitoring script sent an email to the phone of one of the IS&T 
engineers, who was not on campus at the time. The IS&T engineer notified the MIT 
Police and other network engineers, but no one was able to reach Building 16 in time to 
stop or intercept the person who had entered the closet. Later the same afternoon, the 
suspect computer’s MAC address reappeared in MIT’s network logs, showing that it was 
connected, first in MIT Building 4, then subsequently in the Stratton Student Center 
(Building W2027), in the offices of MIT’s Student Information Processing Board (SIPB—
MIT’s student computing group).28  
At approximately 2:00 p.m. an MIT Police officer was driving to the Stata garage after 
his shift in an unmarked police cruiser. He was familiar with the investigation and had 
been informed by radio that the laptop had been removed from the basement closet. He 
had seen the January 4 video of the suspect, as well as stills made from the video, and he 
had a still with him in his cruiser. On Vassar Street, near Massachusetts Avenue, he saw a 
cyclist pass him heading in the opposite direction. Based upon the stills and video, and 
given the backpack and clothes the cyclist was wearing, the officer observed that the 
cyclist matched the description of the suspect from the basement closet. He made a 
U-turn to follow the cyclist, who turned onto Massachusetts Avenue and proceeded north 
towards Harvard Square. When the officer reached the cyclist and pulled alongside, he 
rechecked the still photos that he had in his car and concluded that the cyclist was in fact 
the person in the photos. He immediately called his department for backup. A second 
                                                
26 A few minutes before this person entered the closet, two MIT employees were seen on camera, 
standing in the opening of the closet doorway and then leaving. It is possible that the person utilizing the 
laptop saw these persons leaving the closet and, for that reason, decided to obscure his face while he was in 
the hallway, still walking to the closet, to avoid being identified by them. It is also possible that his 
observation of these employees is why he decided to move the laptop out of the closet and to another 
location. We note that this is speculation on the part of the Review Panel. 
27 See the maps in the front matter. 
28 When the laptop was disconnected from the network and removed from the closet, the IP address that 
it had been using was released by the network. The DHCP server network reassigned this address to 
another user, in another part of the building. Since the IP address was being monitored by IS&T, this 
initially led to some confusion as to where the suspect initially went, and where he initially reconnected his 
laptop. 
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MIT Police officer, accompanied by the special agent, responded by car from the MIT 
Police station.29  
When the cyclist reached the north side of Central Square, the officer who was following 
him decided to pull ahead of him and stop him to ascertain his identity.30 While exiting 
his car, the officer held his credentials so that they could be seen and motioned for the 
bicyclist to stop. The bicyclist complied. The officer explained that he was an MIT Police 
officer and wanted to speak with him. The cyclist first said that he didn’t speak with 
strangers. The officer again displayed his badge, as well as his photo ID. The cyclist then 
said that MIT Police were not “real cops” and refused to talk to the officer. At that point 
the cyclist dropped the bicycle to the ground and started running back toward Central 
Square, on Massachusetts Avenue. The officer chased him briefly, but the individual was 
outrunning him, and the officer returned to his car, made a U-turn, and followed, 
maintaining visual contact. The suspect slowed to a walk, and the officer, still in his car, 
watched and followed him.  
The first MIT Police officer radioed the second and told him where the suspect was 
located. Once near the suspect, both MIT Police officers and the special agent left their 
vehicles and chased the suspect around parked cars. They apprehended and handcuffed 
him.31  
At this time, the officers still did not know the suspect’s identity. One of the officers 
called the Cambridge Police, who arrived and took the suspect to the Cambridge Police 
Department for booking. There, he was identified as Aaron Swartz. Aaron Swartz refused 
to talk to the police. He made a phone call to his friend Quinn Norton, who arranged for 
another friend to rush to the police station with bail money. Shortly thereafter an attorney 
from the firm of Good & Cormier arrived at the Cambridge Police Department, 
completed the paperwork for Aaron Swartz’s bail, and departed with him.  
I.D Events	  of	  January	  6,	  2011:	  Seizure	  of	  the	  Laptop	  
Later on January 6, 2011, after Aaron Swartz was apprehended, members of IS&T, 
accompanied by MIT Police and the special agent, went to the SIPB offices in the 
Stratton Student Center to look for the laptop. Together, they found the laptop with an 
external hard drive, plugged into a network jack. The special agent examined the laptop 
and the participants decided that there was no feasible way to collect evidence from the 
                                                
29 When the backup call was received, the special agent was reviewing the relevant video at the MIT 
Police station. He joined the MIT backup officer. 
30 The MIT Police are deputized under the Middlesex County Police Department.  
31 Aaron Swartz was arrested in connection with an alleged violation of state law, not federal law. The 
special agent participated in the arrest. 
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laptop while it was operating. It was disconnected and turned off. An MIT detective took 
the laptop and the external hard drive as evidence. On February 3, 2011, custody of the 
laptop and hard drive was transferred from the MIT Police to the Cambridge Police. 
I.E Access	  to	  the	  MIT	  Network	  
As it is relevant for the post-arrest narrative, we briefly describe MIT’s procedures for 
network access and review how Aaron Swartz obtained access to the MIT network and to 
JSTOR. 
I.E.1 Connecting	  to	  the	  MIT	  network	  	  
MIT community members who want to use the wired network register by presenting an 
MIT user name and password that were issued to them when they began employment, or 
first registered as students, or were given a formal appointment at MIT, and they obtain 
permanent registrations for their computers. All other individuals—“guests”—who want 
to connect to MIT’s wired network supply a personal name and an email address as 
contact information, and they obtain a registration that is valid for up to 14 days a year of 
cumulative use, as explained on IS&T’s information page:32 
IS&T offers short-term network service to campus guests. Guests are 
allowed up to fourteen days of network service when they register on the 
wired MIT network (MITnet) . . . .  
For wired connections, plug the Ethernet cable into the computer and to an 
MITnet network drop . . . .  
The machine needs to be configured for DHCP (obtaining an IP address 
automatically) . . . .  
Once the equipment is ready to connect, open a web browser and point it 
to any web page. A page will appear, prompting to select your registration 
option. After selecting Visitor registration, the returned page will display 
the MITnet Rules of Use, followed by a screen requesting the visitor's 
contact information, number of days of connectivity, and the event for 
which they are on campus.  
Visitors can register between one and five (consecutive) days at a time, up 
to fourteen days per year. 
  
                                                
32 See Network Connectivity for MIT Guests, <http://ist.mit.edu/network/netguests>. 
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More precisely, the requirement to register is triggered when the computer asks MIT’s 
DHCP server to issue it an IP address. It is also possible to configure a computer to use a 
self-assigned “static IP address,” in which case there will be no registration request 
(provided that the static IP address is in an appropriate range, and does not conflict with 
an address that has already been assigned). MIT’s procedure is that static IP addresses 
should be requested through IS&T, so as to avoid conflicting address assignments, which 
would result in disruption of service.33 
As noted above (footnote 8), Aaron Swartz registered five times in 2010: September 24, 
October 2, 8, and 22, and November 28. When the laptop was located in January 2011, it 
had a static IP address. At some point,34 Swartz had switched from using DHCP-provided 
IP addresses to using a static self-assigned IP address.35 
I.E.2 JSTOR	  and	  eControl	  
MIT operates a very open network. Anyone can come onto campus and plug their 
computer into an MIT network port, or connect to the wireless network.36 Connecting to 
the wired network, and getting connected automatically, requires registering the computer 
the first time it is plugged in. Connecting to MIT’s wireless network does not require 
registration.  
Prior to January 2011, any computer connected to the MIT network could access JSTOR. 
In the wake of the October 2010 downloading incident, and as a direct result of that 
incident, the Libraries and IS&T decided to deploy an authorization system for JSTOR 
called “eControl” that had been designed by the MIT Libraries to more narrowly restrict 
access by the MIT community to certain electronic databases. Under eControl, requests to 
access JSTOR would require a valid MIT certificate and be verified against MIT’s 
Human Resources directory, and only MIT faculty, students, or staff—not guests—would 
be granted access to JSTOR. Guests seeking access to JSTOR would now have to come 
to the MIT Libraries and use a library computer there. 
MIT was prepared to implement eControl as early as October 2010. JSTOR and MIT 
were mindful that an abrupt change would diminish user convenience for the MIT 
community. JSTOR asked MIT to delay deployment of eControl to allow JSTOR to add 
an explanatory message to the JSTOR web page that would advise MIT users of the 
change, and redirect them through the eControl process. JSTOR informed MIT that this 
                                                
33 See “Request an IP Address/Host Name,” <http://ist.mit.edu/network/ip-request>. 
34 MIT is not sure when, as there is no MIT system of record that would have indicated this. 
35 He used two different addresses, 18.55.6.240 and 18.55.7.240.  
36 MIT’s framework for network security follows the general principle that, while access to individual 
resources on the network could be restricted, access to the underlying network should be as open as 
possible. This reflects a general computer system design methodology called the End-to-End Principle.  
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change would not be ready to implement until after December 18, effectively putting off 
the planned activation of eControl until after MIT’s winter holiday break.  
On the morning of January 3, MIT and JSTOR agreed to expedite the implementation of 
eControl, and the system was activated on January 10, 2011. Since then, guests at MIT 
can access JSTOR only from certain workstations located in the libraries. 
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cutting-edge Internet technologies. By the age of 19 he had started and sold a successful 
web-publishing company.1 He was also the cofounder of Demand Progress, an Internet 
blog and activist group self-described as focusing on civil liberties, civil rights, and 
government reform.2 
II.A.1 Aaron	  Swartz	  in	  Cambridge	  
Aaron Swartz was neither a member of the MIT staff, nor an enrolled student nor 
alumnus, nor a member of the faculty. He was a regular visitor to the MIT campus and 
interacted with MIT people and groups both on campus and off. His web-publishing 
startup was developed with the help of an entrepreneurship accelerator company “boot 
camp” that arranged for him to be housed on the MIT campus for the summer of 2005.3 
After a short period in San Francisco, he returned to Cambridge in 2006 and lived in an 
apartment on Massachusetts Avenue in Central Square, between Harvard and MIT. He 
was a member of MIT’s Free Culture Group,4 a regular visitor at MIT’s Student 
Information Processing Board (SIPB), and an active participant in the annual MIT 
International Puzzle Mystery Hunt Competition.5 Aaron Swartz’s father, Robert Swartz, 
was (and is) a consultant at the MIT Media Lab. Aaron frequently visited his father there, 
and his two younger brothers had been Media Lab interns. 
Aaron Swartz was a respected contributor to the World Wide Web Consortium’s 
Semantic Web, HTML, and TAG (Technical Architecture Group) activities. He attended 
gatherings of the Semantic Web working group that met at the MIT Computer Science 
and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, and he was an invited speaker at one of the 
gatherings in 2008. 
In 2010, Aaron Swartz became a research fellow at Harvard University’s Edmond J. 
Safra Center for Ethics,6 invited to conduct experimental and ethnographic studies of the 
political system and to prepare a monograph on the mechanisms of political corruption. 
                                                
1 The company was Infogami, which was used to support the Internet Archive’s Open Library Project. 
Infogami later merged with Reddit, which was subsequently acquired by Condé Nast. 
2 Since the suicide, there has been an enormous amount of information published about Aaron Swartz, 
and speculation about why he downloaded the JSTOR material and about factors contributing to the 
suicide. See for example, Larissa McFarquhar, “Requiem for a Dream,” in the New Yorker, March 11, 
2013, <http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/03/11/130311fa_fact_macfarquhar>; Wesley Yang, 
“The Life and Afterlife of Aaron Swartz,” New York Magazine, February 8, 2013, 
<http://nymag.com/news/features/aaron-swartz-2013-2/>; Quinn Norton, “Life Inside the Aaron Swartz 
Investigation,” The Atlantic, March 3, 2013, <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/03/life-
inside-the-aaron-swartz-investigation/273654/>; and many others. 
3 The accelerator company was Y-Combinator (<http://ycombinator.com>). Aaron Swartz was housed in 
Simmons Hall. See Swartz’s web log of June 11, 2005, for his comments about arriving in Cambridge. 
4 <http://freeculture.mit.edu/>, now inactive. 
5 MIT Mystery Hunt, <http://www.mit.edu/~puzzle/> 
6 <http://www.ethics.harvard.edu> 
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He had an office at the Center, and he was a regular contributor to discussions and 
activities there. 
After Aaron Swartz’s arrest, Harvard suspended his fellowship and banned him from the 
Harvard campus, pending the outcome of an investigation into whether he had also used 
Harvard’s computers or network for similar activities.7 MIT took no action itself, but at 
Aaron Swartz’s arraignment on January 7, 2011, Cambridge District Court Judge Thomas 
ordered him to stay away from MIT property as part of the conditions of release.8 U.S. 
Magistrate Judge Dein imposed the same ban as a condition of Aaron Swartz’s release at 
his initial appearance and arraignment for the federal indictment on July 19, 2011.9 At the 
time of the federal arraignment, Aaron Swartz was residing at two locations: one in 
Brooklyn, New York, near his employment as an independent contractor in New York 
City; and the other in Cambridge, Massachusetts.10 
II.A.2 Possible	  motives	  for	  downloading	  
As far as the Review Panel knows, Aaron Swartz made no statement after his arrest 
regarding what he had planned to do with the downloaded documents. The Review Panel 
views the question of what he intended to do with the information that he was 
downloading from JSTOR as remaining open.11 Speculations about his motives reference 
a statement about free information to which he contributed, as well as two previous, large 
download experiences.  
The federal indictment states that the downloading was “with the purpose of distributing 
a significant proportion of JSTOR’s archive through one or more file-sharing sites.” That 
is, the alleged motive is that Aaron Swartz intended to place the material on the Internet 
so that it could be freely distributed around the entire globe. In support of this 
                                                
7 Although the investigation apparently did not find that he did this, his fellowship expired before this 
finding was made, and before the ban was lifted. Harvard’s OGC declined to comment for this review. 
8 Recall from Part I that Aaron Swartz was arrested under Massachusetts Law. 
9 The Federal District Court conditions of release are at 
<http://ia600504.us.archive.org/29/items/gov.uscourts.mad.137971/gov.uscourts.mad.137971.6.0.pdf>. As 
far as the Review Panel has been able to determine, the Cambridge District Court and Federal Court bans 
were imposed at the recommendations of the District Attorney and the federal prosecutor, respectively, and 
no one in the MIT administration asked for them or knew about them. The federal conditions of release also 
included the requirement that Aaron Swartz “undergo medical or psychiatric treatment as directed.” 
10 Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Change Residential Address, Doc. 15 (filed September 8, 2011), 
United States v. Swartz, Case No. 1:11-cr-10260-NMG.  
11 Also open is the question as to why Aaron Swartz used the MIT network for the downloading, as 
opposed to the Harvard network, to which he already had registered access. Lawrence Lessig, Director of 
the Safra Center and Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, suggests that Aaron Swartz did the 
downloading at MIT so as not to create trouble for Lessig and the Safra Center. (Lawrence Lessig on 
“Aaron’s Laws—Law and Justice in a Digital Age,” 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9HAw1i4gOU4&feature=player_embedded>.) 
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interpretation of his purpose, the government pointed12 to a “Guerilla Manifesto” he 
posted on the Internet in 2008. This “manifesto” included the following: 
We need to take information, wherever it is stored, make our copies and 
share them with the world. We need to take stuff that’s out of copyright 
and add it to the archive. We need to buy secret databases and put them on 
the Web. We need to download scientific journals and upload them to file 
sharing networks. We need to fight for Guerilla Open Access.13 
Federal law enforcement apparently took the first sentence, “We need to take 
information, wherever it is stored, make our copies and share them with the world,” as 
the motive and purpose behind his extensive downloading—some 4.8 million articles, or 
80% of JSTOR’s database of journals. (“It is alleged that Swartz avoided MIT’s and 
JSTOR’s security efforts in order to distribute a significant proportion of JSTOR’s 
archive through one or more file-sharing sites.”)14  
Collecting the JSTOR articles through the MIT network was not the first time Aaron 
Swartz had engaged in large-scale downloading, although it was the first time he was 
charged with a crime. In 2008, he downloaded about 20 million pages of documents from 
the government-run PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) system. Unlike 
the JSTOR documents, these were all in the public domain.15 “He donated the 19,856,160 
pages to http://public.resource.org, an open government initiative spearheaded by Carl 
Malamud as part of a broader project to make public as many government databases as 
Malamud can find.”16 The FBI opened an investigation, but apparently concluded that no 
laws were violated, and thus no charges were filed.17  
                                                
12 Government’s consolidated Response to Defendant’s Motions to Suppress at 3, Doc. No. 81 (filed 
November 11, 2012), United States v. Swartz, Case No. 1:11-cr-10260-NMG.  
13 <http://archive.org/stream/GuerillaOpenAccessManifesto/Goamjuly2008_djvu.txt>. Aaron Swartz was 
not the sole author of the memo, and it is unknown whether he authored the sentences that were quoted. 
Quinn Norton told the Review Panel that she did the final editing of the piece, and that she does not know 
who the other authors were, or who contributed which part. 
14 Supra at 4 n.15; see also USAO Press Release July 19, 2011, 
<http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2011/July/SwartzAaronPR.html> 
15 John Schwartz, “An Effort to Upgrade a Court Archive System to Free and Easy,” February 12, 2009, 
New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/13records.html?_r=0>. 
16 <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/10/swartz-fbi/> 
17 Aaron Swartz, together with public-domain advocate Carl Malamud, identified numerous instances of 
personal identifying information that was supposed to be redacted or hidden in these public documents that 
had been left available for viewing: “names of minor children, names of informants, medical records, 
mental health records, financial records, tens of thousands of social security numbers.” They then sent their 
results to 31 district courts. The federal Judicial Conference eventually changed its privacy rules. See the 
comments by Public.Resource.Org Director Carl Malamud, in his January 23, 2013, memorial “Aaron’s 
Army.” 
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Aaron Swartz also participated in a study of downloaded articles concerning the payment 
by interested organizations to experts, including law professors, to publish papers in 
academic journals. He wrote a script that downloaded articles from Westlaw, and a 
second script that extracted the relevant information about the funding sources from the 
footnotes of each article.18 This has been cited as support for a different possible motive 
for his actions: an intention to cross-reference the entire JSTOR database by author, 
publisher, and funding source, so as to demonstrate the extent to which JSTOR’s service, 
and thus the fees it charged, was enabled and funded by public money.19 In support of 
this interpretation is Aaron Swartz’s self-description on the first page of his blog: “He 
[Aaron Swartz] is a frequent television commentator and the author of numerous articles 
on a variety of topics, especially the corrupting influence of big money on institutions 
including nonprofits, the media, politics, and public opinion. From 2010–2011, he 
researched these topics as a Fellow at the Harvard Ethics Center Lab on Institutional 
Corruption.”20  
One can also speculate that Aaron Swartz had not decided what he would eventually do 
with the articles at the time of the downloading.21 
  
                                                
18 S. Barday, Punitive Damages, Remunerated Research, and the Legal Profession, 61 Stanford L.R. 711 
(2008). Aaron Swartz’s name does not appear in this publication, but Professor Lawrence Lessig, now the 
Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership at Harvard Law School, and who at the relevant time was 
a Professor of Law at Stanford University, told the Review Panel that Ms. Barday did this study for a 
seminar he was teaching at Stanford Law School, and that he suggested that she and Swartz work together. 
Aaron Swartz and Ms. Barday collaborated on research for the piece, downloading the articles using Ms. 
Barday’s user ID. “The database was compiled using Python source code extracting all entries contained in 
the Westlaw “Journals and Law Reviews” database, including full-text articles. The first three footnotes 
and the Westlaw “cite as” field were then extracted from the articles. Articles receiving outside funding 
were identified using  . . . search terms as they appear in one of the first three footnotes in each article.” We 
note that one of the articles cited in this study was authored by Review Panel member Peter A. Diamond. 
19 Lawrence Lessig in “Aaron’s Laws—Law and Justice in a Digital Age,” 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9HAw1i4gOU4&feature=player_embedded>; Quinn Norton, “Life 
Inside the Aaron Swartz Investigation,” The Atlantic, March 3, 2013, 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/03/life-inside-the-aaron-swartz-
investigation/273654/>. On the other hand, the Review Panel notes that JSTOR provides a service, JSTOR 
Data for Research <http://dfr.jstor.org>, that researchers can access (including for downloading) to obtain 
some of the information for such a study. 
20 <http://www.aaronsw.com/>.  
21 Carl Malamud, in his memorial to Aaron Swartz, writes, “I’m convinced that Aaron had not made a 
decision to release those articles, and I am certain he would not have released them without a great deal of 
post-download analysis.” (Aaron’s Army: On Crime and Access to Knowledge,” 
<https://public.resource.org/crime/pamphlet.pdf>). Or, as his friend Quinn Norton told the Review Panel, 
“He liked to collect data sets.” Norton also told the Review Panel that Swartz was shocked by the arrest: he 
didn’t regard what he’d done as a big deal and was surprised that people were making so much of it. His 




Report	  to	  the	  President	  








Peter	  A.	  Diamond	  
Andrew	  Grosso	  
Douglas	  W.	  Pfeiffer	  (support)	  
	  
July	  26,	  2013	  
	   	  

Case 1:11-cr-10260-NMG   Document 53   Filed 09/12/12   Page 1 of 16
Case 1:11-cr-10260-NMG   Document 53   Filed 09/12/12   Page 2 of 16
Case 1:11-cr-10260-NMG   Document 53   Filed 09/12/12   Page 3 of 16
Case 1:11-cr-10260-NMG   Document 53   Filed 09/12/12   Page 4 of 16
Case 1:11-cr-10260-NMG   Document 53   Filed 09/12/12   Page 5 of 16
Case 1:11-cr-10260-NMG   Document 53   Filed 09/12/12   Page 6 of 16
Case 1:11-cr-10260-NMG   Document 53   Filed 09/12/12   Page 7 of 16
Case 1:11-cr-10260-NMG   Document 53   Filed 09/12/12   Page 8 of 16
Case 1:11-cr-10260-NMG   Document 53   Filed 09/12/12   Page 9 of 16
